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ABSTRACT
This report presents the potential use of 3-D data at NUWES on trial
runs to provide information on the geometry of two vehicles in the vicinity
of intercept. Smoothing of data segments provides velocity components as
well as smoothed estimates of vehicle locations. Analysis of this smoothed
data can be analyzed to establish (1) distance between vehicles, (2) vehicular
heading, directional angles, (3) look angle for attack vehicle, (4) attack
angle, (5) projected intercept point and time, (6) projected miss distance,
















3-D data provided to Proof and Test by Instrumentation is of the form
(t ,x.,y.,z ) for a sequence of equally spaced times. When a trial run
involves an attack, by one vehicle (A) on another vehicle (B), the geometry
in the vicinity of intercept is of special interest. Intercept geometry is
examined in this report.
The data received by Proof and Test is assumed to be smoothed using
the 7-Point Least-Squares Polynomial procedure as described in Reference 1.
The smoothed values of x.,y., and z. are considered the best estimates11 1
of the actual locations of the vehicles at any time. In addition, the
smoothing provides information on the direction and velocity of each
vehicle.
The trial run (labeled Trial 2) used for illustration in this study
consisted of data with all y coordinates being negative. In addition,
the general direction of the vehicular paths and of the vehicles in the in-
tercept portions of the trial were in the negative y direction. For this
reason the reference direction from which the vehicular directions were
measured was taken to be the negative y direction. A general sketch of
the horizontal geometry in the vicinity of intercept is shown in Figure 1.
Mathematical analysis of the intercept geometry is described in




Figure 1. Horizontal Geometry for Projected Intercept
II. GEOMETRY OF INTERCEPT
A. Analysis of Horizontal Components
There are several aspects of an intercept that are of particular
concern. The horizontal components (x,y) were considered first as de-
scribed below.
1. Distance between vehicles
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2. In addition to providing smoothed values for vehicular coordinates
at any time, the smoothing procedure provides estimates of the vehicles ve-
locity components. These are the coefficients (b
,
and b ,) of the
xl yl
first order term in the smoothing polynomials. (The time unit for these
components is the time interval between observations and must be converted
if estimates of actual velocities (x. and y.) are desired.)
l l
The horizontal components of the heading direction angles of the two
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3. Horizontal Look Angle
The horizontal Line-of-Sight Angle to vehicle 3 from vehicle A is
x - x
n B A0.„ = arctan
ab T=^T= (-yA )
The horizontal Look Angle is the angle between the direction vehicle




Both angles are shown in Figure 1.
4. Attack Angle
The horizontal Attack Angle is the difference in the horizontal direc-
tions of the two vehicles, i.e.,
a =
A
- Qn .A B
This is also shown in Figure 1.
5. Projected Intercept Point
Assuming instantaneous linear paths for both vehicles, the point at
which these two paths intercept (I) has the horizontal components
,
(X
B " V + 7A tan 9A " 7B tan Q I
y l
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Again, the Projected Intercept Point is shown in Figure 1.
6. Projected Miss Distance
The horizontal component of the Projected Miss Distance is the distance
between points I and B, i.e.,
2 2
U2
7. Actual Miss Distance
The Actual Miss Distance and the Attack Angle are of importance in
damage assessment. For purposes of illustration, it is assumed that the
points A and B (point sources for the position location system) are lo-
cated on the noses of the vehicles and that vehicle B has length c .
(Note that determination of the point and angle of impact may require inter-
polation between observational times.) The point and angle of impact, if it
occurs are sketched in Figure 2a. The actual impact point is at a distance
d* = d . Figure 2b shows the situation where the attack vehicle (A) passes
behind the target vehicle (B). The actual Miss Distance is
d* = (d - c) .
Figure 2c shows the situation when the attack vehicle crosses ahead of the
target vehicle. The actual miss distance is
d* = d .
When the two vehicular paths do not intersect, the determination of
actual miss distance requires further examination.
-y











2c. Miss with d = d
Figure 2. Actual Horizontal Miss Distance
II 3. Analysis of Vertical Components
This analysis was not completed during the research period covered by
this report.
III. ILLUSTRATION
A. General Description of Trial Run
3-D data from a trial run at NUWES (the investigator's Trial #2)
will be used for illustration of the concepts presented in Section II. The
paths of the two vehicles in the horizontal plane are shown in Figure 3a
and the vertical components in Figure 3b. Three attacks occurred in this
trial. These are labeled 211, 212, and 213 and occur approximately at
times t = 2130, 2201, and 2270, respectively.
For each of these intercept attempts a sequence of plots was pro-
duced. These are discussed in the following sections and are shown in
Figures 4, 5, and 6. Each figure is started by a magnified plot of the ve-
hicular paths in the x,y plane (labeled 2IH) and of the vertical path
(2IZ). These are followed by a sequence of plots of the geometry of the
horizontal situations at observational times in the vicinity of the at-
tempted intercept. Actual intercept did not occur in any of the three
attacks.
The vertical components of the attacks have not been examined in
any detail. It should be noted, however, that the attacks were aborted in
the vertical direction while the appear to be continued in the horizontal
plane. This is presented in Table I.

































































TABLE 1. Differences between Horizontal and Vertical Attacks
Approximate Vertical Distance Horizontal Distance
Event Time between vehicles between vehicles
Abortion of Attack #1 2125 3.1 425.5
in vertical plane
Discontinuance of
Attack #1 in 2131 171.1 47.0
horizontal plane
Abortion of Attack n 2196 9.0 562.1
in vertical plane
Discontinuance of
Attack //2 in 2202 148.0 204.0
horizontal plane
Abortion of Attack #3 2268 5.9 431.5
in vertical plane
Discontinuance of




3. First Attack (211)
This attack was initiated when vehicle A (the attack vehicle) de-
tected vehicle B (the target vehicle) at approximately time t = 2110 (see
Fig. 3a). The portion of this attack in the vicinity of intercept is shown
in Figure 4a (horizontal components, 2I1H) and Figure 4b (vertical compo-
nent, 2I1Z). The geometry of the vehicles in the horizontal plane at times
in this vicinity are shown in Figures 4c-j. Actual intercept was not
achieved since the attack appears to have been aborted in the z component
at about time t = 2125 while the attack vehicle was still a substantial
distance from the target vehicle in the horizontal plane.
It would appear that the attack was continued in the horizontal plane
until about time t = 2131 (see Figures 4i and 4j ) when the attack vehicles
did not intersect. The closest approach of the attack vehicle occurred at
about time 2132 after the attack vehicle had discontinued the attack.
It should be noted that there are many missing observations (circled
points) particularly in the path of the target vehicle. These are most
frequent after the attack has been discontinued and thus may not present a
serious problem.
There are also two potential outliers (boxed points) in the z compo-
nent of the path of the attack vehicle. The first of these is at time
t = 2125 and possibly indicated a change of path (abortion of attack) rath-
er than an actual outlier. These potential outliers and nearby missing
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C. Second Attack (212)
This attack was initiated at approximately time t = 2130 (see Fig.
3a). The portion of the attack in the vicinity of intercept is shown in
Figure 5a and 5b. The geometry of the vehicles in this vicinity are shown
in Figures 5c-£. Again, actual intercept was not achieved since the attack
was aborted in the vertical direction at about time t = 2199 when the at-
tack vehicle was still about 364 feet from the target vehicle (see Fig. 5b
and 5g). Actual crossing of the vehicular paths occurred at about time
t = 2201 (see Fig. 5i) although discontinuance of the attack in the hori-
zontal plane was not apparent until t = 2203 (see Fig. 5k) when the attack
vehicle appears to have initiated the next search cycle (see Fig. 5a, also
Fig. 3a). The smallest distance was about d 117 and occurred at about
time t = 2204.
The only missing points in this attack were the scheduled ones (every
eighth point). The only potential outlier in the horizontal plane occurred
in the target path after the attack was broken off. The potential outliers
in the vertical plane of the attack vehicle path present a more serious
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D. Third Attack (213)
This attack was initiated at approximately time t = 2250 (see Fig.
3a). The portion of this attack in the vicinity of intercept is shown in
Figure 6a and 6b. The geometry of the vehicles in this vicinity are pre-
sented in Figures 6c-j. As in the previous attacks, actual intercept was
not achieved with the attack being aborted in the vertical direction at
about time t = 2168 (see Fig. 6b) when the vehicles had a separation of
d = 431.5 (see Fig. 6f). Discontinuance of the attack in the horizontal
plane was not apparent until about time t = 2272 when the distance between
the vehicles was about d = 215.5 (see Fig. 6j). The smallest distance be-
tween the two vehicles in the horizontal plane occurred at about time
t = 2273 when it was d = 177.4.
Missing points (other than the scheduled ones) occurred only in the
target path and only after the attack was completed. Three potential out-
liers were noted. The one of greatest concern was in the vertical compo-
nent of the attack vehicle path at time t = 2268. Subsequent analysis is
expected to confirm that this is indicative of the change in the attack ve-
hicle path when the attack was aborted rather than an actual outlier (wild
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Figure 6c. 2I3H t = 2265
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The analysis presented in this report could be of value in assisting
anyone concerned with details of what actually occurred in an attack by a
vehicle on a moving target vehicle. In case an intercept actually occurs,
the point and angle of impact can be of use in damage assessment. When an
intercept is not achieved, the miss distance (smallest distance between the
vehicles) could be of interest. For example, when the attack vehicle
crosses the target vehicle's path behind the target vehicle, examination of
the geometry could be of assistance in determining whether the target vehi-
cle was actually attacking the disturbance in the wake of the target vehicle
instead of the target vehicle itself.
Incorporation of figures such as Figure 3a-j into a program for proc-
essing 3-D data would require computer graphics. Incorporation of such
graphics at all observational times would result in an undesirable volume of
computer output. Restriction of the graphics to the vicinity of intercepts
would be preferable but would require identification of these vicinities.
One possible alternative procedure would be the reservation of special in-
tercept graphics to intercepts of special interest identified by a user of
the general data smoothing output as a separate subroutine not included in
the general data smoothing program.
There are several aspects of the intercept problem which have not been
covered in this report and need further examination. Three of these are:
1) Geometry of the vertical components in the vicinity of intercept
has not been completed. This should be developed and included in
the program. For example, vertical attack angle and miss distance
need to be considered as well as horizontal attack angle and miss
distance to determine actual attack angle and miss distance.
:']
2) Treatment of ponts indicated as potential outliers by the sequen-
tial differences procedure should be examined in more detail
(Ref. 2). Thus, for example, potential outliers are identified in
the vertical components of the attack was aborted in the vertical
direction and should be interpreted as signifying a change in path
rather than a wild observation. (Such a change in path can be ex-
pected when an attack, results in intercept and the geometry at this
point is of special concern.) Examination of some of the potential
outliers in this trial run and the contamination of their treatment
by neighbouring missing points warrants further treatment and
should be considered in a separate report.
3) Coincidence of observational times with times of greatest concern
for vehicular geometry (i.e., intercept point) cannot be expected.
Some capability for interpolation between observational times may
be of some interest.
32
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